Mapping India’s Quest for Maritime Power in Indian Ocean Region in the Cold war Years
Dr. Subhajit Ghosh
HOD & Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science
Krishnath College, Berhampore, Mushidabad, West Bengal.
Email: subhabehala99@gmail.com
Abstract
The rulers of the pre-British period were probably not at all very aware about the maritime security and strategic policy. But after occupied by the British it has been brought in the discussion of maritime power and India’s geographical location. The statement when made, it was perhaps related to the control of the sea at its surface. However, technological advances forces India to see the thought in a multidimensional context which extends to the depth of the Ocean as well as to the space above it. The conflict between two super powers had made a grave situation and its impact on Indian Ocean create vulnerabilities. At the same time all other Indian Ocean littoral countries (including India) as also the effected extra-regional powers or countries were basically endeavouring to safeguard their genuine maritime interests in this Ocean. India has pursued a consistent policy of steadily increasing her naval capability in the Indian Ocean, which was also, shows her opposing position in any extra –regional naval presence.
Key Words: Indian Ocean, Maritime Security, Super Power Rivalry, Naval Power, Geopolitics.
Introduction
In the pre British period there were no such types of attention to say about the impotency of Indian Ocean, particularly in making of Indian strategic thinking. The rulers of the pre British period were probably not at all very aware about the maritime security and strategic policy. But after occupied by the British it has been brought in the discussion of maritime power and India’s geographical location. The famous American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan “predicted that the Indian Ocean would play a decisive role in the strategic calculus of the world in the 21st century. It is the only all weather sea-lane”. The statement when made, it was perhaps related to the control of the sea at its surface. However, technological advances forces India to see the thought in a multidimensional context which extends to the depth of the Ocean as well as to the space above it. As per geographical outlook the horizontal dimension shows that, the littoral states of the region become key actors, hence the relevance of the region as opposed to the Ocean by itself.
In identifying the history of India and the different phase of colonial rulers, it can be said “the Munhall were land-based empire of Central Asia origin, and the British a sea-based empire. For the moment, India was rising more in the way of the British. Just as the British Royal Navy ruled the seas, allowing for the protection of its crown colonies, notably India, the story of a rising India is, at least in military terms, the story of its navy. Hemmed in on land by a combination of the Himalayan Mountains and failing states from Pakistan and Nepal to Bangladesh and Burma, India can best project power at sea. India stands sentinel astride the major sea-lanes from the Straits of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, where the threat of naval or containerized terrorism is very real.” In the year 1498, when Vasco da Gama had landed at Calicut a new dimension was added to the maritime power of India, and its was the military component. Before the British in power in India, The Portuguese were followed by Dutch, then the British and the French, who rode into Indian waters on the back of ‘blue water’ naval capability. Some of these extra-regional navies were successfully challenged by the ‘brown water’ coastal navies of India kingdoms. It was too late to recognise the importance of the sea by the Indian Rulers, when the Marathas came in power in the early 18th century. “Sivaji was near enough to the Portuguese base of Goa realise its importance and did initiate a policy of naval expansion which in the heyday of Maratha power ruled the Konkan waters. Hyder Ali also did not fail to realise its vital importance as his agreement with of Sivaji the control of the seas had already passed to the Dutch and the British, and by the time of Hyder Ali, the British were the undoubted masters of the Indian Ocean, though the transcendent genius of Suffren eclipted the fact for a short time. For 157 years (since the departure of Suffren in 1784 to the fall of Singapore in 1941) the mastery of the sea over Indian history was complete but unobtrusive. The question of sea power did not arise as the Indian Ocean was a British lake. It was as natural and as normal as the air we breathed during that time and no one was invested in discovering the relation of the sea to Indian Defence. In the result the entire emphasis was on the land frontier and Indian defence was equated with the maintenance of a powerful army on the North-West Frontier” Basically all countries of the Indian Ocean littoral (with the exception of Australia and, according to some analysts, South Africa) belong to the underdeveloped or developing categories. They also constitute the vast majority of the nations of the Third World concept in cold war period. There are twenty eight littoral States and six Island States has occurred position in the Indian Ocean Region as a hole, among them Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles are located off African coast in the Western Indian Ocean side and the other two Island States (Sri Lanka and Maldives) in the South Asian part. All these Island States bears significant geopolitical importance in this region, particularly in relations with India from the security perspective. So far as the geopolitics is concern the Ocean is either through two northern narrow “choke points” i.e. Seuez Canal or Horn of Africa and Singapore or Straits of Malacca or through two southern borders “gateways” at the southern extremities of Africa and Australia. The Southern Indian Ocean, in fact, provides the shortest distance between the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean. Beyond the littoral states, the landmass to the north was dominated by the Soviet Union and China, two communist powers hostile to each other at the time of ideological conflict with the Western World. The conflict between two super powers (Soviet Union and United States) had made a grave situation and its impact on Indian Ocean create vulnerabilities. When these two powers which were asserting their own versions of ‘geopolitical claim’ on the entire Indian Ocean, at the same time all other Indian Ocean littoral countries, as also the effected extra-regional powers or countries were basically endeavouring to safeguard their genuine maritime interests in this Ocean.
In the context of Indian Ocean, prior to Second World War, the British colonial mindset had focused on India as the maritime centre piece of its Indian subcontinent-ruled territories, which were connected to India mostly by the seas. The total area of Ocean was virtually dominated by the British was called ‘British Lake.’ “The gate way to the Indian Ocean was attacked from the land side. After a short siege Singapore surrendered and the safety and security of the Indian Ocean for 150 years a British Lake, had vanished at one stroke. The entry of Japan into the Indian Ocean demonstrated clearly the entire dependence of the security of India on the mastery of the seas. The Andaman and Nicobars passed into enemy hands. That sealed the doom of Burma, Which was thereby cut off from all sea communications with India.
There is a strong belief among Asian nations that it was the neglect of Ocean frontier security that led to their domination by colonial powers during the 15th to the 19th centuries. In case of India, the littoral dominance by the European powers, first by the Portuguese and then by the British and French resulted in their ascendency of the Indian heartland. Significantly for India and other Asian countries the colonial imperial supremacy came from the sea, to the littorals and into the heartland. Then the foremost strategic objective of our country was to build autonomous maritime military capability to preclude intrusive dominance of the littorals by any external powers. But soon after Independence, India was engaged in wars across her land frontiers and military developments, which was shaped by the strong continental mindset among the ruling elite.
Despite achieving victory in the Second World War along with her allies, Britain lost much of her power and vigour to continue holding the colonial territories. But it had already been weakened in the colonial areas for two main reasons. The first one is the economic burden of two world wars and their devastating effects generated grievous crises in the colonial capitalist system, not only that colonies became a burden because of the requirements of security, administration and excessive costs of social commitments and the second reason is during the inter-war period, the nationalist movements grew in political strength with popularity and got muss support in the South Asian sub continent and elsewhere in the British colonies. During the legacy of the world war situation and its aftermath, Britain preferred to maintain her security commitment on a selective basis kin the India Ocean region and kept her forces stationed in Singapore, the Persian Gulf and Aden. It was true fact that Britain remained the dominant sea power in the Indian Ocean after the long decolonisation process had began. But the process led to a period of instability and to an interregnum in that area, which was similar to the history of the end of Portugal’s thalassocracy in the seventeenth century. The British naval presence as a part of an East of Suez strategy had been justified due to her anti communist policy, interest for Middle Eastern oil supplies and legacy with the former colonies in South Asia. ’’In order to offer a credible deterrence, and augment her forces in the region, Britain entered into a system of military alliances (SEATO, CENTO). In addition to collective security arrangements, Britain also created a central strategic reserve force to move rapidly to any area of conflict. More importantly, she introduced a relatively self-contained naval task force to show the flag and to deal with minor crises. The Suez conflict of 1956, however, shattered Britain’s interventionist capability in the area. The dismal end to the Suez operation marked a watershed in British strategy, necessitating a total reappraisal of her defence policy in the Indian Ocean region. The Suez debate also undermined Britain’s prestige as a world power.” But after debate the British Government has changed her policy, where she emphasised on the use of sea power to provide highly mobile, self contained combat troops with amphibious capability that would no longer depend on overseas bases. Actually due to economic constraints, Britain had started to emphasised on the collective approach to Indian Ocean security. They had suggested adequate partnership of the NATO allies and Australia, and some burden-shring arrangements on the ground that they all shared common interest for the stability and peace of the region.
It is important to mention that the United States of America regarded the British presence in the Indian Ocean as a vital contribution to the cause of the free world, as they had major commitments in the Atlantic and North Pacific. So that, US responded soon after Britain’s distressed call for financial help and increased defence cooperation enabling Britain to augment her capabilities in maintaining her tradition security role in the area. In this part of cooperation the Britain Government had agreed with American proposal for developing a chain of Small Island as joint stating posts. With an understanding Britain agreed to provide the island i.e., the Chagos Archipelago (Diego Garcia) and three other islands Deschorres, Farquahar, and Aldabra for use as bases to facilitate joint military participation. These groups of island were known as British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which were formerly part of Mauritius and Seychelles.
In connection with the main discussion of India’s maritime security in the cold war starting phase the importance of Indo-British naval cooperation for Indian security has to be mentioned here. According to the writings of K.M.Panikkar there were identified two major factors to describe about the situation. These two are as follows: first, the lessons from Indian history, in which the power in control of the Indian Ocean determined the destiny of India, and secondly, the inability to show the naval strength for assuming supremacy in the territorial waters of India. Visualizing the future he stated that,” future of India would be decided on the sea”. He also felt that Indian maritime security could be guaranteed only through a military alliance with India’s immediate colonial master. He firmly believed that only the Indo-British “Monroe Doctrine for the Indian Ocean region” could maintain the Ocean as a closed area and followed by it India would be protected from outside attack. The Indian Ocean could be protected by surrounding it with naval and air bases at the “farthest suitable points”. This type of defence related assumption stated that, it would have involved the participation of Britain, India, Mauritius, Socotra, Ceylon, the Andaman and Nicobar islands, Siam and Indo-China.
“With the Doctrine of non-alignment as the basis of India’s foreign policy, however, these views were summarily dismissed by the Indian Government. Nevertheless, Panikkar’s advice on matters maritime and naval was often sought by the Indian Ministry of Defence. This was particularly the case for the proposed acquisition of the aircraft carrier in the mid 1950s. After his death in 1963,soon after military assistance had been sought from Britain and United States, following the war with China. His influence on Indian maritime policy rests essentially on the attention he focused on the general vulnerability of India’s maritime assts, and the nature and extent of its maritime traditions in the Indian Ocean.” Basically in this phase “the British naval presence in the Indian Ocean was not perceived as a threat to Indian security. Not only did Britain have no reason to threaten India in military terms, but it was actively involved in assisting India’s naval expansion plans.”
It was true that Indian leaders were able to resist naval expansion in the early years after her Independence but she has took a long time after Independence to accept her role as the pre eminent maritime power in the Indian Ocean Region. Focusing on Pakistan and China and the overarching continental mindset, India had continued to dictate the defence priorities of her own with some complaining that the Indian Navy was being relegated to the background as the most neglected branch of the defence services. In “the 1947-49 war between India and West Pakistan over Kashmir aggravated the pains of partition, and heightened concern over a Pakistan threat to Indian security. Since Pakistan neither had a sufficiently large navy or air force, nor had they been used in a combat role during the war, Indian defence planners concentrated on land operations by the Pakistani army. The primary aim of the Indian military lay in inflicting a decisive defeat on Pakistan’s army at the earliest possible time from the outbreak hostilities. The Indian army therefore retained its dominant role in defence policy, while the air force was provided a major role in support of land warfare. As the navy had not taken part in the war, it was accorded only a minor role during another Indo-Pakistani conflict. This was confined largely to the protection of the Indian coast and island territories.”
At the end of the Second World War it was also observed that, the US Navy had appeared to secure her maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The situation seems to create a high-intensity naval conflict by rendering its nuclear power. It was true that, “until the mid to late 1960s, US naval superiority over the Soviet Union was not questioned. Conventional military conflict between the superpowers, although planned for on the scenario of a Warsaw Pact move on Western Europe and other regional flashpoints, took on proxy forms in ‘wars of national liberation’ in which the USs was rarely challenged at sea. As a result, logistic lines of communications across the Pacific used to sustained US intervention on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam were largely unimpeded.” In the second face of the cold war period was a trouble period for Indian naval security, which could be identify from 1954 to 1966 as concerning with the advanced age of its warships. In the post independence period of India the acquisitions, including the cruiser and the three destroyers of the Indian Navy were modern ships, the older ones in the fleet were some 15 to 20 years of age. Not only that the ships which were hurriedly acquired during the Second World War, including the four sloops were built to a lower specification, and had not upgraded. Therefore an immediate priority for the navy and its modernisation and expansion of its assets was needed. Naval Chief Vice Admiral Sir Mark Pizey (Royal Navy), who had taken over in October 1951 and proposed a development plan for the force. “The Pizey expansion plan effectively indicated a major reassessment of the future role and composition of the Indian navy. It critically shifted the emphasis from the development of a naval force capable of air, surface and subsurface operations, to one devoted primarily to defensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The execution of these operations was assumed on the basis of a global war between United States and its allies (including the British Commonwealth), and the military forces of the Soviet Union and China. It was felt that since most of India’s maritime trade was carried on Western bloc ships, the Indian navy would join western naval forces during the global war.”
The withdrawal of the British naval forces from the Indian Ocean in the late 60s has gave birth the myth of “Power Vacuum” in the Ocean. It was followed by increased presence and activities by Western alliance members. The increasing and operational role of the external forces like Soviet Union and United States specially were virtually gave rice to make a greater potential for instability. In that decade the Indian Ocean acquired attributes which subsequently caused it to be identified as a separate region attracting international interest and making it a source of conflict and rivalry. At the House of Foreign Affairs sub-committee of United States Mr.Owen Zurhellen , the then Jr.Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had made his comment on US’s interest at Indian Ocean. Including India, the littoral states of the Ocean had not raised voice against it. American military move to Diego Garcia was initially supported by the then British Government. “In support of their belief, the US officials cited earlier agreements between the United Kingdom and the USA on the Diego Garcia Island in 1966 and 1971 and said they had been initiated with the Labour Government.” To clarify the US’s position in the India Ocean the then US Ambassador to India, Mr.Daniel Moynihan declared that, “the US “interests” in the Indian Ocean were more important than those of India. He also pointed out that the island was 1,600km away from India and said that there was nothing of fundamental concern for India there. He did not say how many kilometres it was from the USA. Perhaps, he considered it America’s own lake!” In the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers at Washington on June24, 1969 had described that, “Diego Garcia is one of a number of Indian Ocean islands included in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). We have an agreement (1966) in principle with the British to construct facilities in these is- lands.2 Diego is attractive because of its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, it is British territory, and the only inhabitants are non- indigenous copra workers imported from Mauritius and the Seychelles. In the event of U.S. Government approval of the project, the British are obligated at our request to remove these workers. In its attempts to control over the hole Indian Ocean area through the 7th Fleet ,the US navy had launched a dependable satellite communication system. The basic purpose of the US 7th Fleet was to dominates the Western Powers as they controlled the egress and ingress points of the Indian Ocean and in describing the situation Admiral Moorer had pointed out that, ‘in time of conflict, any waterway such as the Suez canel is highly likely (to) be closed by one side or the other.’ Basically in the late 1970’s and early1980’s there were so many events had observed in discussing America’s foreign and military interests in the Indian Ocean area. The creation of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1979 was to warn Soviet Union not to attempted military control over Persian Gulf region. In 1983 this RDF appears as the military arm of the then new Florida-based Central Command and it was working for 19 South-Western Asian countries including Pakistan, while India was under the jurisdiction of the Hawaii-based Pacific Command . But the American administration had a special attention to her naval based at Diego Garcia for its geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean and also for the absence of military base of any other powers. “Construction work on the island included the extension of the runway to 12,000 feet to enable transit facilities for B-52 bombers, and the dredging of part of the lagoon. Some 1800 marines and 17 ‘roll-on, roll-off’ container ships were also deployed in the area. These ships were loaded with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery systems and supplies and stores to maintain a force of 12,000 troops for 30days in warfare. At least one battle group was permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean.” Not only in the Indian Ocean, US had extended her acquired facilities in Oman which became importantly for strategic thinking in Persian Gulf also. Oman provides the capabilities of sea control and maritime air operations in proximity to the Strait of Hormuz for US administration. Besides this “in August 1980, US and Somalia initialled an agreement that provides for US use of Somali ports and airfields at Mogadishu and Berbera,” which was formerly used by the Soviets for close attachments in Arabian Peninsula. In case of America it (Berbera) was accessed to close with the Strait of Bab el Bandeb.
On the other hand the Soviet naval presence in Chittagong and in the eastern of Africa i.e. Mauritius, Malagasy, Somalia, Socotra and Hoddeida had also observed by India. In search with the light of cold war history, it is necessary to point out on the Soviet presence in counter with the US presence. “Since the British had virtually dominated the Indian Ocean for one-and-half centuries, their declaration in 1968 to withdraw by the end of 1971 was viewed in certain pro-colonial circles as the main reason for the emergence of the Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. Moscow, it was alleged, was eager to fill the “power vacuum” concept came in handy to explain the US military presence in the Indian Ocean as counter move necessitated by Soviet desire to replace the British power in the region.” In a version American scholar Oles M.Smolansky pointed out that, “Moscow’s entry into the Indian Ocean need not be viewed as a surprising and unexpected development. In the 1950s and early 1960s the USSR succeeded in neutralising the nuclear preponderance of the United States by building a sizeable stationary nuclear capability of its own and the Soviet navy entered the Mediterranean in the mid-1960s as a defensive move against the US sea-borne nuclear striking force. Similar motivations, in Smolansky’s view, persuaded the Soviet decision-makers to expand their naval presence in the Indian Ocean as well.” It has been observed that, “the Soviet naval presents in the Indian Ocean began in March 1968. When four ships from Vladivostok made goodwill visits to six Indian Ocean countries-SriLanka, India, Kenya, Somalia, Pakistan and South Yemen. Such goodwill cruises were the principal activity through late 1969. Since then, the Indian Ocean force has spent most of its time in the northwestern portion of the ocean, where the Soviets have acquired use of several port facilities.”
For India, the post independence period had forced her to think about the protection of the land border dispute and the situation related to Pakistan on the West and East side and China on the North of the Country. Apart from that the Indian Ocean was only one important oceanic area for the other countries, but for India it was the vital sea, as viewed by Panikkar. He also mentioned that, in the post second world war situation “the strategic area in Indian warfare was not so much the Burmese frontier, as Malaya, Singapore and the neglected Andaman islands. What was of utmost importance in safeguarding India’s communication with Europe was not Bombay or Colombo, but Diego Suarez and Aden. It was the oceanic space that dominated the strategy of Indian defence.” To be important to mention here that, India has pursued a consistent policy of steadily increasing her naval capability in the Indian Ocean, which was also, shows her opposing position in any extra –regional naval presence. Describing the military strength of the then Indian defence sector it could be mentioned that by 1961 India had transformed her navy from a small coastal force to a balance force which were consisted of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, seventeen destroyers, six mine sweepers and one ocean-going tanker and also had augmented shore- based naval aviation. But it was in sufficient for her security. After the war against Pakistan and creation of Independent Bangladesh in 1971, India’s strategic perceptions of the Indian Ocean and her future security role in South Asia underwent a radical change. It was clear that the maritime threat from Pakistan did not represent a threat to the survival of the Indian government. The Pakistani threat was viewed as limited to Kashmir and did not present a real threat to the Indian centre. Pakistan, in the early years of its existence, was incapable of conducting a major attack, though India did realize that the threat from Pakistan would continue to evolve. Given that Pakistan’s only line of communication was around India and over the seas, India believed this condition would compel Pakistan to build a formidable navy. There were mainly two reasons to make concrete decisions for India in case on Pakistan’s intention in that scenario. Actually “Pakistan’s initial interest in the Indian Ocean was confined to the security of sea lanes between East and West Pakistan. But Pakistan’s naval capability has never been able to keep the merchant shipping and naval deployments open between Karachi and Chittogong. First, building a strong naval force to match the strength of the Indian Navy was never within Pakistan’s national means. Secondly, until the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan strategists believed that East Pakistan could be defended from West Pakistan, which assumed that Pakistan could capture Indian territories in Punjab and Rajistan which might then be bargained with Indian advances in East Pakistan .This was a great strategic fallacy, as is evident from India’s successful blockade of the Bay of Bengal in December 1971, which prevented any resupply to Pakistani troops”
“It was clear that, as an in all previous wars and operations, no End States had been visualised. While there is merit in pressing for political directives or End States to conflicts, the reality is that they may not be forthcoming. Hence, the End States definition may be hazy and strategies must be prepared for that contingency.” The Cumulative Indian experience to hold the control of total sea has had a powerful impact on her naval expansion programme. It was undertaken in the changing strategic environment in South Asia. In the Indian navy was greatly aided by Soviet Union, and with the help of the Super power India had launched a massive programme of rapid deployment and modernisation of its naval fleet. The then time “the Indian Navy has 12 submarines, ten destroyers, 27 frigates, a cruiser and an aircraft carrier with 51 combat aircraft, and a large number of combat helicopters. Also, India has acquired Sea Harriers for her aircraft Vikrant.” At that time “the ratios of investments in surveillance versus weapon-delivery platforms had an adverse impact on the conduct of maritime operations. While any platform with its captive air reconnaissance capability will eventually find targets on its own on which to unload ordnance, other platforms can effect encounters only if directed by the maritime domain awareness infrastructure.” In this discussion submarine deploying and conducting a campaign of Indian navy has automatically hold an important point. The report of Ministry of Defence (Indian Navy), 2007 also says that, “with conventional submarines, the number of boats on actual patrol can rarely exceed 60% of the force level. Their use in future wars must be part of an all arms strategy that synergises aerial surveillance, air- to-surface interdiction and mining. Support papers for a submarine campaign would aid the overall effectiveness of these assets.” In connection with the discussion regarding India’s role in the Indian Ocean Admiral S.N.Kohli projected as a seaman’s viewpoint that, “India prospered when the seas were used extensively but suffered a decline when they were neglected. But there is a large amount of truth in that postulate. After all, the last two hundred years of India’s colonization became possible when seafaring nations arrived and settle down here. Lack of a well-organised navy had led to India’s subjugation by the Europeans.” He also identified the distinctions between ‘sea power’ and ‘naval power.’ According to Admiral Kohli “sea power is a broad concept embracing not only means of combat but also auxiliary craft, commercially shipping, bases, fishing, other exploitation of the sea and seabed resources and the trained personnel needed for all these operations. In other words, almost anything that is relevant to conducting operations, whether civilian or military, on the sea, constitutes sea power. Power here means capacity or ability to use the sea, including, but not restricted to, fighting naval battles (the latter, the more restricted use of the concept of sea power, is naval power). The geography of a nation is crucial here. India’s key position at the head of the Indian Ocean astride the East-West trade route is an asset. Its extensive territory provides a vast hinterland, while it has immediate access to the ocean and a large number of islands under its control on either side of the peninsula. All these factors provide for its great potential as a sea as well as naval power.” Might be the aim was to be a strengthen herself a largest Naval Indian army in Asia, next to Soviet Union. “This has been motivated by India’s aspiration to play a dominant role in the region. The Soviet Union’s strategic interest in beefing up the Indian military complex was her policy for China and which enables her generated fears of Indian domination among her small neighbours.” “Perhaps it was India’s own sense of vulnerability from an ‘expansionist China’ during the1962 border war which introduced the extra-regional element into her Indian Ocean strategy.”
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 has a significant importance. It could be described as a profound interest in Asian and World security as well. In fact the treaty provided the seal of approval for Indian intervention in East Pakistan. Indian initiative and the situation in creation of independent Bangladesh is to be mentioned here. In mid December of 1971, a US naval task force which was led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, entered in the Bay of Bengal to evacuate American from war-torn in East Pakistan. In the eve of the third Indo-Pakistani war , the US carrier’s deployment was also coincided with the presence of several (additional) Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean. Although the initial the US publicly release their intention, which was to be “a show of force By the United States for the benefit of both India and the Soviet Union.”, the then President Nixon later clarified the event to be a gesture of support for Pakistan and China both in the light of increased Soviet Naval presence in the region. On the other hand India and Soviet Union lashed out at the American presence and the Soviet administration labelling this event as “Gunboat Diplomacy” and gross blackmail against India. Taking advantage of the conflict between China and Soviet Union, the US had the strategy of building a new balance of power against the Soviet Union. On the basis of an accommodative Sino-US relationship thus leaving Southeast Asia for China to take care of , with American concentrating on South Asia, Southwest Asia and West Asian regions. On the contrary the Soviet policy was to support the then ongoing national independent movement in East Pakistan and to strengthen the anti imperialist force. In the Indo-Pak war of 1971, Soviet determined to support her allies and coerce her adversaries using naval diplomacy. The war led to record deployment levels for both superpowers-14 combatants and auxiliaries for the US and 26 for the Soviets. The Soviet deployment was intended to demonstrate support for India, coerce Pakistan and offset the politico-military effects of the enterprise. The concept of sea power had become more accepted as relevant to the Soviet Union’s ambitions and capabilities. It shows a new willingness to use Soviet naval forces. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was traditionally interpreted interims of the expansion of the Soviet fleet. It was an attempt to counter the expected deployed of American “Polaris A-3”Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and the limitation of American influence in the area. In addition to this a primary political objective has appeared which were the denuclearisation of the Indian Ocean and the curtailment of the presence of the naval powers of the superpowers. In this endeavour the negotiations between US and USSR were carried out in 1977-78 for the limitation of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean.
In the 1970s the Indian navy’s and government’s policy towards the Indian Ocean primarily revolved around the increasing presence of superpower naval forces and the declaration of ‘Zone of Peace’ and the changes in the international law of the sea were vital to analyse her strategy in the concern security aspect. But basically “Pakistan has suggested that the scope of arms limitation in the Indian Ocean should also include the littoral and hinterland states, or that some acceptable equilibrium of naval forces of the regional powers be negotiated in a bilateral or multilateral framework. Secondly, Pakistan has been proposing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia (NWFZSA) which it considers complementary to the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ) proposal. This signifies the assumption that mere withdrawal of naval forces of the superpowers would not make the Indian Ocean a peace zone: this would also require regional detente, denunciation of nuclear weapons by the Indian Ocean states and mutual and balanced force reduction among the key regional states.” The origin of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace could be traced out to various measures adopted and under consideration in pursuit of disarmament in the early 1960’s. “The idea of a Peace Zone, including a nuclear free zone has been advanced by some countries including Sri Lanka. The objective of such a Peace Zone would be to ensure that the major powers, by tacit or explicit action, by mutual agreement or unilaterally, will agree to respect the region as a zone where they will refrain from any action injurious to the cause of peace. This means, among other things, that the freedom of the high seas will be subject to important voluntary limitations. It also means that the great powers will likewise voluntarily limit their involvement in collective security arrangements and will not seek or use any facilities for militarising the Indian Ocean. A parallel corollary of a Peace Zone is that regional States bordering the Indian Ocean will themselves refrain from action prejudicial to the concept of a Peace Zone.”
Indian navy had took a significant role in some operations like, Operations Pawan and Operations Cactus in Sri Lanka and in Maldives respectively in 1980s. In this respect the “Operations Vijay and Operations Parakaram of the Indian navy were undertaken with a nuclear backdrop. Navy short-listed three goals, namely, to ensure safety and security of our maritime interest against a surprise attack, to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war and to win the war convincingly at sea. Shifting strike elements of the Eastern Fleet to the North Arabian Sea and mobilisation of all naval assets prevented escalation and contributed towards quick termination of the conflicts. The lesson that emerges for the Indian Navy is on two counts. Firstly, there will be space and scope to conduct conventional maritime operations below the nuclear threshold. Secondly, a window of opportunity would exist to influence the land battle.” In this connection it should be necessary to mention that, “India is among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to establish diplomatic relations. India’s assistance in diffusing the 1988 coup attempt represents the Indo-Maldivian understanding and amity.”
As it has been said that, the superpowers intention were to expand and intensification of armed conflicts within and among states of the Indian Ocean region to be foremost challenged, while the non-aligned countries emphasized on the danger due to the military presence of the superpowers as the primary issue and supporting the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace issue. Maldives was not exception on that issue. “Maldives has suggested that the countries situated in or bordering on the Indian Ocean should take a new and collective initiative to ensure the early realization of the objectives of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal.”
After realizing the fact of the matter of the India-Maldives maritime relation, it should be also clear that, the island country occupies an important position in India’s security concerns in the Indian Ocean Region. Particularly it is important to analyse in terms of Chinese involvement in it. “The Chinese and Maldivian ambassadors to Sri Lanka started visiting each other in the early 1960s. China supported the Maldives in its struggle for national independence and the two countries established diplomatic relations in October 1972 with the Chinese ambassador to Sri Lanka concurrently accredited to the Maldives. In 1981, China and the Maldives started economic and technological cooperation, and in 1982 restored direct trade. Starting from 1985 Chinese companies began entering the project-contracting market in the Maldives.”
The end of the Cold war phase was interesting to highlight on the fact that, China’s growing involvement in the Indian Ocean was very significant in the security calculus of India. Particularly in the South Asia the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives strategic triangle was influenced by the Chinese naval diplomacy. “According to Lowell Dittmer a strategic triangle may be under stood as a sort of transactional game among three players’, with transactions being understood as exchanges.” In his conclusion Sithara N. Fernando said that, “with regard to the regional context, triangular relations involving China, India and Sri Lanka had tended towards a stable marriage with enmity in China- India and India-Sri Lanka relations but with amity in China-Sri Lanka relations in the late 1980s whereas prior to normalisation of China-India relations, China-India-Maldives triangular relations tended towards a romantic triangle.” On the contrary it is also to be noted that, “the evolving Chinese maritime calculus in the Indian Ocean thus matured into a three dimensional strategy which rested on: multilateral diplomacy; bilateral diplomacy at the regional and superpower levels which relies on congruence of interests with its erstwhile enemy, the United States, and; the build-up of China’s naval capabilities, conventional and nuclear, to serve a more oceanic-oriented naval doctrine.” The period was also observed historical linkages between India and the Island States of the Western Indian Ocean region. Due to the presence of Indian Diaspora basically the littoral States i.e. Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles have diplomatic and trading relations with India. The geostrategic importance of those countries bears significant importance in India’s security purpose. “Indians began to be brought to Mauritius in 1834 as indentured labourers to work in sugarcane fields and by the time the indentured labourer system was abandoned, Indian immigrants formed majority of island’s population which now constitutes two-thirds of it.” India has helped to develop the defence related programmes in Seychelles. She has sent military and naval advisers to Seychelles People’s Defence Force (SPDF) and in 1989 Seychelles Defence Academy was established with the help of Government of India. Our government also has gifted a Dornier aircraft to Seychelles to conduct maritime surveillance with its Exclusive Economic Zone in the end period of cold war. “Diplomatic relations were established with Comoros in June 1976 two years after its independence. India set up its Consulate in Madagascar in 1954, which was upgraded to an Embassy in 1960 as Madagascar gained independence.” “Diplomatic ties with Seychelles exist since the very first day of its independence in June 1976. However the first resident High Commissioner to Seychelles was appointed in 1987.”
Conclusion
In concluding part of the article it may consider as a critical analysis as stated by the Prof. C. Raja Mohan. He wrote that, “Over the last decade one of the best kept political secrets in India has been that the peace zone concept had been turned into an anti- Indian platform by some of India’s neighbours. India’s support for the peace zone and the demand that the great powers be thrown out of the Indian Ocean were widely interpreted as a transparent attempt by New Delhi to establish its own hegemony in the Indian Ocean.
Two developments in the recent past made the concept of zone of peace irrelevant. The end of the Cold war undermined one of the central assumptions of the concept. The need to avoid the negative consequences in the Indian Ocean littoral of the Soviet-American rivalry. The collapse of the Soviet power fundamentally transformed the political scenario in the Indian Ocean.”
In the Cold War period Indian view of maritime security had been driven and affected in the Indian Ocean due to the influences and strategic thinking of its colonial rulers. The presence of the extra regional powers and their mind set had an impact on India’s strategic policy of maritime domain. On the one hand the country has to face the challenges of economic development, border related issues, and the internal solidarity, on the other hand the challenges from the neighbouring countries which had a deep rooted problem regarding security. Overall India as a South Asian and one of the most important geostrategic country in the Indian Ocean had a multidimensional challenges in the Cold War period observed here as a whole.
References